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2PER CURIAM.
Kevin Williams, an inmate in the Pennsylvania State Prison system, filed a § 1983
complaint in 2001, alleging that the defendants: (1) placed Williams in administrative
segregation at SCI-Rockview for over four months, without a hearing; (2) verbally harassed
Williams while he was in administrative segregation; (3) were deliberately indifferent to his
serious psychological needs at a time when he had suicidal thoughts; and (4) fired him from his
prison kitchen job in retaliation for filing grievances against his supervisor, all in violation of his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  He sought damages.
The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim.  By
order entered June 3, 2002, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report
recommending dismissal and, with the exception of the retaliation claim, dismissed all of
Williams’s claims as to all defendants.  The District Court dismissed the due process claim with
prejudice for failure to state a claim because Williams’s 139-day confinement in administrative
custody did not impose the type of atypical significant deprivation that gives rise to a protected
liberty interest.  The District Court also dismissed Williams’s Eighth Amendment harassment
claim with prejudice, holding that verbal abuse, alone, does not amount to a constitutional
deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.  However, the District Court dismissed without
prejudice Williams’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious
psychological needs because it was not properly pled, and granted Williams leave to file an
amended complaint. 
Williams amended his complaint, alleging that while he was incarcerated in
administrative segregation at SCI-Rockview in April 2001, and on several occasions thereafter,
3the defendants denied him psychological treatment that he had requested because he was feeling
suicidal.  Williams also claimed that staff psychologists Walmer and Allen refused his written
requests for psychological treatment and that his numerous grievances regarding the lack of
psychological treatment were ignored.
Williams re-alleged his retaliation claim in the Amended Complaint, adding that
in March 2001, he filed a grievance claiming that defendant Emel harassed him and tried to get
him fired from his prison job hauling kitchen trash.  He claimed that Emel then directed other
prison officers to fire Williams.  He alleged that Rackovan did nothing about the retaliatory
conduct.
The District Court denied defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint.  The Defendants moved for summary judgment.  In September 2003, the
District Court denied summary judgment as to the retaliation claim with respect to defendants
Meyer, Sowash, Townsend, Emel, and Rackovan, and granted summary judgment on Williams’s
Eighth Amendment claim as to defendants Burke, Meyers, Allen, Walmer, and Wheeler.  In
granting summary judgment, the District Court noted that (1) the Suicidal Risk Indication Check
List, completed three times during Williams’s confinement in administrative segregation (in
April, June, and July 2001), indicated that Williams did not express suicidal ideation; (2) none of
Williams’s request slips for psychological treatment mentioned that he had suicidal intentions,
and (3) when he was evaluated by Dr. Burke in August 2001, Williams denied any suicidal
ideation, denied any history of suicidal attempts, and refused psychotropic medication, describing
himself only as depressed and frustrated.  Based on the undisputed facts, the District Court held
that there was no record evidence that the defendants knew that Williams was suicidal.
  Williams’s appeal from the District Court’s order entered September 2, 2003,1
docketed as No. 03-3938, was consolidated with his appeal from the final judgment
entered November 4, 2003.
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In October 2003, a jury trial was held before a Magistrate Judge on the retaliation
claim.  At the close of Williams’s case in chief, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter
of law, arguing that Williams had failed to establish that the defendants terminated his job in
retaliation for his pursuit of the grievance process.  After considering the testimony and exhibits,
the District Court granted the motion.  On November 4, 2003, judgment was entered against
Williams and on behalf of all defendants.  Williams timely appealed.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review of the
District Court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is plenary.  “We must determine
whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiffs may be entitled to relief,
and we must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn therefrom.”  Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 
We review de novo an order granting summary judgment.  Saldana v. K Mart Corp., 260 F.3d
228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 232; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The “nonmoving
party cannot rely upon conclusory allegations in its pleadings or in memoranda and briefs to
establish a genuine issue of material fact.”  Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 24
F.3d 508, 511-12 (3d Cir. 1994).  Rather, the nonmoving party “must make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of every element essential to his case, based on the affidavits or by the
5depositions and admissions on file.”  Harter v. GAF Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Finally, our review of the District Court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 50(a) is plenary.  Hofkin v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir.
1996).
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment as to Williams’s due process and
Eighth Amendment claims substantially for the reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s
Opinion filed on May 6, 2002, and in the District Court’s Opinion entered September 2, 2003. 
We will also affirm the District Court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law on Williams’s
retaliation claim, as further discussed below.
In order to prevail on his retaliation claim at trial, Williams had to prove that the
conduct that led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected, that he suffered some
“adverse action” at the hands of prison officials, and that exercise of the constitutional right was
a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged action.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34
(3d Cir. 2001).  Prison officials may still prevail by proving that they would have made the same
decision absent the protected conduct for reasons that are reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.  Id. at 334.
We agree with the District Court that there was no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find that the defendants retaliated against Williams for pursuing
grievances about his prison work supervisor.  According to Williams’s trial testimony, upon his
transfer to SCI-Rockview in June 2000, he started working in the kitchen waiting tables in the
cafeteria.  Within a month, he was re-assigned to washing pans in the kitchen, and then to
hauling kitchen trash.  He received good work reports.  Before he filed a grievance about his
6work as a kitchen trash hauler, Williams had minor differences with one of his supervisors,
defendant Emel, over his late appearances for work and his inability to work with other inmates. 
After Williams filed his complaint in March 2001, Emel continued to raise the same problems
with Williams’s work.  On March 20, 2001, Williams submitted a request slip to his block unit
manager, Jack Aller, requesting a job change.  That same day, he was reassigned to another job in
the kitchen because he was unable to work with the other inmates on the job.  The evidence
shows that Emel’s complaints about Williams’s work predated Williams’s grievance, and thus,
there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that the exercise of a
constitutionally protected right was the motivating factor for firing Williams from his old job or
for re-assigning him to a new one.
Finally, Williams argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion for
appointment of counsel for purposes of trial.  We conclude that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in denying counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993).  As the
District Court correctly noted, the case was not complex and expert testimony was not necessary
to make out a case of retaliation.
We have fully considered the remaining contentions in Williams’s brief and we
find no merit in any of those contentions.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgment.

